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Abstract 
Financial reporting disclosures are very essential to the shareholders of a company because they frequently use these 
disclosures for their economic decisions about the business enterprise.  Board of directors, corporate management 
and external auditor may have an influence on financial reporting disclosures. From this perspective, the study 
investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial reporting disclosures. The results show that corporate 
governance is significantly associated with the extent of financial reporting disclosures. External auditor, multilisting 
and profitability are significantly (5 per cent level) associated with overall financial reporting disclosures index. 
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1. Introduction 
It is believed that there is an association between corporate governance and financial reporting disclosures. The 
scandals of high profile companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other firms in the U.S, have realized 
the question of the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in organizations (Raphaelson and Wahlen, 2004). 
Corporate governance reduces emerging market vulnerability to financial crises, reinforces property rights, reduces 
transaction costs and the cost of capital, and leads to capital market development. Weak corporate governance 
frameworks reduce investors’ confidence, and can discourage outside investment. Corporate governance is affected 
by the relationships among participants in governance system. As owners of equity, institutional investors are 
increasingly demanding a voice in corporate governance in some markets. Individual shareholders usually do not 
seek to exercise governance rights but may be highly concerned about obtaining fair treatment from controlling 
shareholders and management. Creditors play an important role in a number of governance systems and can serve as 
external monitors over corporate performance. Employees and other stakeholders play an important role in 
contributing to the long-term success and performance of the corporation, while governments establish the overall 
institutional and legal framework for corporate governance (OECD: 2004).  
In Bangladesh, January 10, 2011 is called Black Monday because the stock market collapsed on that date and has not 
yet recovered. A lot of measures have been taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other 
regulators, but there is no result of these efforts.  Almost every day of 2011 and 2012, small investors were engaged 
in many activities, including procession, press-conference, hunger-strike, block the roads, and close the stock market 
trade as a part of their expression of frustration. The probe report opined that there are many issues that are 
responsible for collapse of the market. Governance of SEC and other institutions could not satisfy the probe 
committee (PC). One of the main recommendations of the committee was the removal of chairman, executive 
director and directors of SEC (SMIR, 2011). This recommendation clearly indicates a red flag for corporate 
governance.  
SEC issued Guidelines on Corporate Governance in 2006. Listed companies are required to “comply or explain”. 
The Guidelines cover some key topics, including the functioning of the Board, and internal and external controls. 
The Guidelines do not deal with other aspects of corporate governance, including shareholder rights. Compliance is 
at its early stage (World Bank: 2009). There are no provisions for punitive measures for non-compliance of any one 
of the conditions mentioned in the notification. Only “comply or explain” basis is not enough in Bangladesh for 
ensuring good governance.  
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This study strives to analysis overall disclosure index of twenty non-financial companies listed in DSE. This would 
be the first known study to examine the association between corporate governance and overall financial reporting 
disclosures index. The weak form of corporate governance in Bangladesh allows the researchers to (1) review 
corporate financial reporting practices by non-financial companies listed in DSE, (2) identify different aspects of 
corporate governance, and (3) to examine the association between corporate governance and corporate financial 
reporting disclosures index. 
Next, the researchers’ examine the association between corporate governance and corporate reporting disclosures 
index. The researchers capture the impact of corporate governance using three measures, such as dependent variable 
(corporate financial reporting disclosures index), independent variables, and linkage between dependent and 
independent variables. 
Previous researches have investigated a range of factors potentially associated with disclosures including Board 
independence, dominant personality, Board size, institutional ownership, external auditors, general public ownership, 
leverage, asset size, profitability, multilisting, and number of shareholders. However, the influence of corporate 
governance on corporate financial reporting disclosures index has not been examined previously. Present finding of 
significant relationship between external auditor and corporate reporting disclosures index supports the tenets of 
principal-agent theory.  Several other factors found to be associated with corporate financial reporting disclosures in 
prior researches have been controlled. A final contribution of this research relates to the growing body of literature on 
corporate governance (external auditor engagement) and corporate financial reporting disclosures. The research 
provides robust empirical evidence in support of claims in the literature that external auditor’s demand can drive 
corporate action.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the prior literature and develops the 
hypotheses for the study. Section 3 outlines the data and method, section 4 presents the results of the analysis and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review  
One function of financial reporting is to restrain management to act against the shareholders’ interest (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). Global investor opinion survey of McKinsey & Company (2002) reveals that majority of the 
institutional investors is willing to pay a high premium for companies having good governance and accounting 
disclosures are the most important factor that influences their investment decisions. Good governance goes hand-in-
hand with reduced risk of financial reporting problems and other bad accounting outcomes (Hermanson, 2003). 
Information disclosed by the companies in their annual reports can be used as important input in various corporate 
governance mechanisms (Bushman and Smith, 2001).  Good governance by BOD can influence financial reporting 
disclosures, which in turn has an important impact on shareholders confidence. Previous studies have shown that 
good corporate governance reduces adverse effects of earnings management as well as likelihood of creative 
financial reporting arising from fraud or errors (Beasley, 1996; McMullen, 1996). Traditionally, the external auditor 
has also played an important role in improving the credibility of financial information. Hen and Jaggi (2000) found a 
positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors and the comprehensiveness of 
information in mandatory financial disclosure of Hong Kong companies. Eng and Mark (2003) found that lower 
managerial ownership and significant government ownership are associated with increased disclosure and that an 
increase in outside directors reduces the corporate disclosure of firm listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. 
Extensive occurrence of individual and family run companies tends to discourage professionalism, encourage non-
compliance and facilitate creative accounting as well as to result in severe conflicts of interests (Halim, 2001). 
3. The Variables and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Dependent Variable: 
An Overall Disclosures Index (ODI) of sample companies was used as dependent variable and several corporate 
governance and control variables were used as independent variables to test the influence or impact of corporate 
governance variables over the ODI. 
3.2 Primary Independent Variables (Corporate Governance Variables):  
1. Board Independence (bi) 
2. Dominant Personality (dp) 
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3. Board Size (bs) 
4. Institutional Ownership (io) 
5. General Public Ownership (gp) 
6. External Auditor (ea) 
3.3 Secondary Independent Variables (Control Variables) 
1. Leverage (lvg) 
2. Asset Size (asstsz) 
3. Profitability (profitab) 
4. Multi Listing (multilis) 
5. Number of Shareholders (shareholders)  
Board Independence 
The board, which comprises of a number of independent directors, has a greater monitoring and controlling ability 
over management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In Bangladesh, SEC corporate guidelines stated that one-tenth of the 
total number of the company’s board of directors, subject to a minimum of one, should be independent directors. But 
in Malaysia, if a company has only three board members, two of them are required to be independent. Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Ho and Wong (2001) found a significant positive association. But, Eng and Mark (2003), Gul and 
Leung (2004) found a negative association.  This variable is taken in this study as an independent variable and the 
hypothesis is: 
Ho: There is no association between board independence and overall disclosure index. 
CEO Duality / Dominant Personality 
The corporate governance literature has emphasized the need to separate the position of CEO (chief executive officer) 
and board chairman to guarantee the board independence and improve transparency (Jensen, 1993). In this respect, 
Dechow et al. (1996) revealed that the duality CEO-chairman increases the likelihood of violating the accounting 
principles in American firms. CEO duality is considered as an independent variable in this study and the hypothesis 
is: 
Ho: There is no association between CEO Duality and overall disclosure index   
Board Size 
A larger board size may bring a greater number of directors with experience that may represent a multitude of values 
(Halme and Huse, 1997) on the board. On the contrary, a reduced number of directors imply a high degree of 
coordination and communication between them and managers (Jensen, 1993. Board size is taken as an independent 
variable and the hypothesis is: 
Ho: There is no association between board size and overall disclosure index.  
Institutional Ownership 
Considering the influence of shareholder activism in governance reforms is important to obtain insight into 
governance practices (Daily et al., 2003). To date, institutional investors’ participation has emerged as an important 
force in corporate monitoring mechanism to protect minority shareholders’ interest. Institutional ownership is 
accepted in the present study as an independent variable and the hypothesis is: 
Ho: There is no association between institutional ownership and overall disclosure index. 
General Public 
The greater will be the details required of an item of information, the more comprehensive will be the disclosure of a 
firm (Apostolou and Nanopoulos, 2009). It is expected that if a company has a large proportion of public ownership, 
the political cost will be bigger and the company will decide to disclose more information. We consider General 
Public as an independent variable and the hypothesis is: 
 Ho: There is no association between general public and overall disclosure index. 
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External Auditor 
The external audit can be an effective control mechanism to monitor the managers and guarantee the integrity of 
financial reports. The appointment of an independent external auditor can reduce the probability of earnings 
manipulation by shrinking managerial opportunism (Chung et al., 2003). Several authors advocated that financial 
information is more reliable for “BIG 4” clients in comparison with other companies (Becker et al., 1998). In 
Bangladesh, there are six audit firms that have international links. External auditor is taken an independent variable 
and the hypothesis is: 
 Ho: There is no association between external auditor and overall disclosure index. 
Leverage 
Lenders want reliable information about borrowers. That is why borrowers usually furnish more information in their 
annual reports to meet the information needs of creditors, investors and other stakeholders. But, Belkaoui et al. (1977) 
have observed a significant negative relationship between the mentioned variables. Contrarily, Robbins and Austin 
(1986) had found a significant positive correlation between debt and municipal disclosures. Leverage is selected as 
an independent variable and our hypothesis is: 
     Ho: There is no association between leverage and overall disclosure index. 
Asset Size 
Many disclosure studies e.g., Cooke (1992 and 1993); Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between company asset size and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Asset size is selected as an 
independent variable and our hypothesis is:  
 Ho: There is no association between asset size and overall disclosure index. 
Profitability 
Profitability affects the level of disclosures. There are mixed results found about the association between profitability 
and disclosure. Inchausti (1997), Wallace and Naser (1995) found a positive association between profitability and the 
extent of disclosure. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found a negative association between them. Again, Meek et al. (1995) 
found no association between them. Profitability is used as an independent variable and our hypothesis is - 
 Ho: There is no association between profitability and overall disclosure index. 
Multiple Listing 
Firms listed in more prestigious markets may provide signals to customers, suppliers and creditors about the strength 
of the company and that may also encourages brand recognition. It also provides signals about the future prospects of 
the company. Listing status has been tested and identified to be significant by Meek et al. (1995) and Inchausti 
(1997). Multiple listing is used as an independent variable and our hypothesis is  Ho: There is no association between 
multiple listing and overall disclosure index. 
Shareholders 
Shareholders are treated as both internal and external stakeholders. They can change the management and appoint 
new agents if they believe that the existing management is not managing the entity efficiently. It is expected that a 
large number of shareholders will exert more pressure on management. Number of shareholders is an important 
factor in determining the corporate disclosure level (Alam, 2008). It   is taken as independent variable in this study 
and the hypothesis is- 
Ho: There is no association between number of shareholders and overall disclosure index. 
4. Methodology  
4.1 Selection of Sample  
Stratified sampling technique was used. Each business segment was considered as a stratum. Four stratums and five 
companies from each stratum had been selected purposively. 
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Table -1: Distribution of Population and Sample Size of the Companies 
Stratum Population Size Sample Size 
Sample as percent 
of Population 
Percent of total 
Sample 
Textile 12 5 42 25 
Pharmaceuticals 13 5 38 25 
Cement 7 5 71 25 
Food & Allied 8 5 63 25 
Total 40 20 214 100 
The sample size in terms of percentage of population was dissimilar, but the percent of sample size of each stratum 
was equal i.e., 25 percent.   
4.2 Selection of Disclosure Items 
A draft check list was prepared that provided the basis for a survey with yes / no questions that was used to select the 
individual items for the final checklist. Finally, two-hundred items were used to measure a company disclosure score. 
The 200 items reflect the following disclosure items of an annual report. 
Table -2: Summary of Draft and Final Disclosure Checklist 
Parts 
Disclosure 
Key 
Total Items (Draft) Items accepted (Final) Percentage 
of items 
accepted Number % Number % 
General Disclosure Items GDI 25 11 20 10 80 
Company Profile Items CPI 25 11 15 8 60 
Directors Report Items DRI 30 14 28 14 93 
Financial Highlight Items FHI 30 14 27 14 90 
Accounting Polices Items API 26 12 26 13 100 
Income Statement Items ISI 14 6 14 7 100 
Balance Sheet  Items BSI 48 22 48 24 100 
Cash Flow Statement Items CFSI 22 10 22 11 100 
Overall Disclosure 220 100% 200 100% 91% 
4.3 Scoring of Disclosure Items 
The items were considered equally important to disclose and hence a dichotomous unweighted approach was used 
for scoring. If a company discloses an item it will be awarded one and if not it will be awarded zero.  
4.4 Developing Overall Disclosure Index 
Partial Compliance Unweighted Approach was used to measure the overall disclosure index. This is the first time 
that this approach is used in Bangladesh to measure the overall disclosure index because the level of compliance of 
the companies is not the same.  The formula is as follows: 
 
 
 
Where,  
PCJ = Total compliance score for each company and  
Xi = Level of compliance with each part of disclosure requirement. 
Rj = Total number of disclosure part of each company. 
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5. Statistical Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Surveyed Companies 
Ranking has been made on the basis of coefficient of variation of the company; the lowest coefficient of variation 
means the company is more consistent in disclosing information in annual report and received upper rank. 
Table-3: Descriptive Statistics of Surveyed Companies 
Serial 
No. 
Company Name Rank 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean SD CV ODI 
Textile Segment: 
0.67 
1 HR Textile Mills Limited 12 0.56 0.26 0.46 
0.63 
2 BEXTEX Limited 5 0.76 0.14 0.19 
3 
Apex Weaving and Finishing 
Ltd 
8 0.66 0.14 0.22 
4 Saiham Textile Mills Ltd. 11 0.49 0.16 0.33 
5 Alltex industries limited 8 0.69 0.15 0.22 
Pharmaceuticals Segment: 
6 IBN SINA 7 0.74 0.16 0.21 
0.72 
7 LIBRA 3 0.73 0.13 0.17 
8 SQUARE 4 0.80 0.14 0.18 
9 BEXIMCO 10 0.71 0.18 0.26 
10 ORION 10 0.62 0.16 0.26 
Cement Segment: 
11 
Heidelberg cement Bangladesh 
Ltd. 
1 0.81 0.10 0.12 
0.67 
12 Meghna Cements Mills Ltd. 11 0.62 0.20 0.33 
13 Aramit Cement Ltd. 9 0.62 0.15 0.24 
14 Confidence Cement Ltd. 2 0.63 0.09 0.14 
15 Lafrage Surma Cement Ltd. 9 0.65 0.15 0.24 
Food and Allied Segment: 
16 Apex Foods Ltd 2 0.74 0.10 0.14 
0.66 
17 Fu-Wang Foods Ltd 8 0.66 0.15 0.22 
18 Gulf Foods Ltd 6 0.65 0.13 0.20 
19 Fine Foods Ltd 9 0.61 0.15 0.24 
20 Rahima Foods Corporation Ltd 11 0.65 0.21 0.33 
 
5.2 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis 
Pearson’s Pair Wise Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (r) is computed in order to examine the correlation 
between dependent and independent variables.  
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Table- 5: Correlation Matrix 
Variable odi bi Dp Bs Io Gp Ea lvg astsz pftab multilis sholders 
Odi 1                       
Bi -0.10 1                     
Dp 0.37 -0.14 1                   
Bs 0.21 -0.44* -0.44* 1                 
Io 0.30 -0.01 -0.19 0.62** 1               
Gp 0.05 -0.26 0.10 -0.13 -0.57** 1             
Ea 0.48* -0.17 0.13 0.37 0.34 -0.07 1           
Lvg 0.43* 0.11 0.38 0.16 0.36 -0.44* 0.33 1         
Astsz 0.33 -0.27 -0.04 0.76** 0.57** -0.22 0.45* 0.32 1       
Pftab 0.54** -0.21 0.20 0.39* 0.45* -0.09 -0.04 0.26 0.39* 1     
Multilis 0.54** 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.12 -0.16 0.13 0.40* 0.12 0.05 1   
Sholders 0.42* -0.22 0.13 0.42* 0.13 0.17 0.41* 0.39* 0.64** 0.31 0.12 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggested that simple correlation between dependent and independent variables should 
not be considered harmful until they exceed 0.80 or 0.90. The highest value of the observed correlations is 0.76; 
therefore, the observed correlations are not harmful. These finding suggest that multicollinearity between 
independent variables is unlikely to pose a serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the multivariate 
analysis. 
5.3 ANOVA Technique 
The following table shows the ANOVA and the level of significant at 5 percent. 
Table- 6: ANOVA (b) 
model  sum of squares df mean square F sig. 
1 
  
  
Regression 0.097358001 11 0.008850727 
3.3332935 0.049186143 Residual 0.021241999 8 0.00265525 
Total 0.1186 19  
a predictors: (constant), sholders, multilis, io, bi, dp, ea, gp, profitab, lvg, asstsz, bs  
b dependent variable: odi     
 
P value indicates that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance and overall disclosure index. 
Therefore, null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected. 
5.4 Empirical Model  
It is already observed from the above analysis that there is a relationship between corporate governance and the 
extent of disclosure, but the effect of each variable on the disclosure level is still unknown at this stage. The 
following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model is developed in order to identify the effect of each variable 
on the disclosure level. 
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Where,  
ODI = Overall Disclosure Index 
      α   = the intercept 
          ε   = the error term 
In regression analysis, the enter method of Statistical Package (SPSS) was used in order to verify the influence of 
independent variable that were chosen for the study over the dependent variable. The summary output of the model 
for the all sample companies is shown in the following table. 
Table – 7: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .906(a) 0.821 0.575 0.05153 
a  Predictors: (Constant), sholders, multilis, io, bi, dp, ea, gp, profitab, lvg, asstsz, bs 
The adjusted coefficient of determination of R
2
 indicates that around 57 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by variations in the independent variables. Thus the model is capable of explaining 57 percent 
variability of disclosed information in the annual reports of sample companies. 
Table-8: Coefficients (a) 
Model Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 0.438 0.175   2.495 0.037 
Bi 0.001 0.002 0.093 0.340 0.743 
Dp 0.007 0.072 0.042 0.097 0.925 
Bs -0.005 0.025 -0.118 -0.189 0.855 
Io 0.000 0.001 0.038 0.131 0.899 
Gp 0.001 0.001 0.250 0.944 0.373 
Ea 0.092 0.038 0.519 2.414 0.042 
Lvg 0.006 0.056 0.032 0.103 0.921 
Asstsz 0.000 0.000 -0.058 -0.138 0.894 
Profitab 0.001 0.000 0.611 2.500 0.037 
Multilis 0.161 0.058 0.455 2.752 0.025 
Sholders 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.012 0.991 
A Dependent Variable: odi     
 
It is observed that external auditor, profitability and multi listing are significantly associated with disclosures level. 
The coefficient of external auditor, profitability and multi listing are statistically significant at 5 percent level. The 
board independence, board size, dominant personality, institutional ownership, general public, leverage, assets size, 
and number of shareholders are not statistically significant even at 10 percent level. 
 
6. Discussions 
The purpose of the current study is to examine the level of financial disclosures among Bangladeshi companies and 
its association with corporate governance characteristics. On the whole, the study concludes that the level of 
financial disclosures in Bangladesh has been increasing gradually but it is still below the level of expectation. 
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Besides, the reliability and transparency level of financial disclosures is very low and hence the confidence level of 
external users’ is also very low. Therefore, shareholders do not use the information provided in the annual report in 
making their economic decisions.  Using six corporate governance variables the study found that there is an 
association between corporate governance characteristics and the level of financial disclosures. But, only the 
association between external auditor and the level of financial disclosures is found significant.  In support of agency-
theory and involvement of competent auditors’, the authors provide evidence of the ability of a competent auditor to 
influence corporate financial disclosures reporting. World Bank report stated that audits are not reviewed in 
Bangladesh and many market participants are skeptical of audit quality. There are some key weaknesses in the non-
financial disclosure frame work, especially in the disclosure of ownership and control. 
Other variables such as board independence, board size, dominant personality, institutional ownership and general 
public are not significantly associated with the level of financial disclosures. The weakness of these variables 
indicates that corporate governance structure of Bangladesh is weak. According to the World Bank report (2009), 
‘some companies have one independent director, some have none, board size is about 6 to 8 members, ownership is 
concentrated by a small number of related shareholders- sponsors held 43 percent of the market, general public held 
38 percent and institutional investors held 10 percent’. The WB report clearly shows that board independence, board 
size, institutional ownership and general public are not in a position to influence corporate financial reporting 
disclosures.  
The more powerful the stakeholders, the more ready the company to adapt to meet the stakeholders expectations. 
External users rely on the report provided by external auditor as they don’t have direct access to corporate 
information. These external users would like to have more relevant and reliable information which is used in making 
their economic decisions. According to agency theory, there exists a conflict of interest between concentrated 
ownership and external users. Again, as per stakeholder theory, a company’s continued existence needs the support 
of its stakeholders and their approval must be sought and the activities of the corporation be adjusted to meet their 
expectations (Cotter et al, 2011). Thus, the management of corporations always tries to make them successful by 
providing a healthy picture of companies. Under these circumstances, the opinion about the financial disclosures of 
external auditor plays an important role to the external users. The primary objective of appointing an external auditor 
is to protect the right of external stakeholders by producing a true, fair and reliable audit report. In Bangladesh, 
external auditors work for clients like other employees and their activities cannot protect the right of external 
stakeholders and this is the only reason for which external stakeholders do not fully rely on annual report in making 
their economic decisions. It is commonly believed that auditors are working only for their own incentives and 
companies disclose information only to comply with the SEC rules and guidelines. But, SEC does not examine the 
compliance of financial disclosures and corporate governance code. Consequently, the image of external auditor in 
Bangladesh is degrading day by day.  Although concentrated ownership has the power to influence the level of 
corporate disclosures but they do not have sufficient knowledge about accounting and financial reporting in 
Bangladesh.   
External auditor (an expert in accounting, reporting and auditing) is the only authority (as per the Companies Act 
1994) to certify the financial statements of limited companies. But, external users do not have faith on audited 
financial statements and disclosures. In the International Conference of Chartered Accountants in Dhaka, the 
Honourable President of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Md. Zillur Rahman (2010) warned the professional 
accountants that “The government mostly depends on direct and indirect taxes to meet budget expenditure but many 
individuals or institutions for avoiding the tax amounts prepare their balance sheets in ways which do not reflect the 
real accounts,” .He also urged the Chartered Accountants to show utmost honesty and integrity alongside their 
professionalism in preparing the financial statements for government and corporate entities. He opined that the 
professional Chartered Accountants must always work to ensure transparency and accountability. Therefore, the 
result of our study is fully supported by the assumptions of external stakeholders and others. 
 
7. Conclusion 
It is evident from the above discussion that external auditor, a corporate governance variable, can significantly 
influence the level of corporate financial disclosures.  Other variables, such as, board independence, board-size, 
dominant personality, institutional ownership and general public are not meaningfully associated with the level of 
financial disclosures.  As such, the corporate governance structure in Bangladesh is not at the acceptable level.   
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Finally, there is a potential limitation in the present study that needs to be acknowledged. Board competencies, 
family ownership, managerial ownership, competencies of audit committee members and so on have not been 
included in corporate governance variables as these disclosures were not available in the corporate annual report. 
There are also some key weaknesses in the non-financial disclosure frame work, especially in the disclosure of 
ownership and control (WB, 2009).   
8. Opportunities for Further Research 
Findings of this study warrant further investigation on corporate governance scenario in Bangladesh using 
governance & transparency index (GTI).  
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